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1.  Introduction 
 
It is well documented that many—mainly developing—economies pursue procyclical 
macroeconomic policies that amplify the business cycle. Particular attention has been 
paid to the cyclical nature of fiscal policy in developing economies, with ample 
evidence that this typically has been procyclical (e.g., Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini 
2008). The recent literature relating to the cyclicality of monetary policy arrives at 
broadly similar conclusions—that is, monetary policy also is generally countercyclical 
in industrial economies and procyclical in developing economies with tentative 
evidence of a transition to countercyclical monetary policy in some of the latter (Frankel 
2011; McGettingham, Moriyama, Ntsama, Painchard, Qu and Steinberg, 2013; Vegh 
and Vuletin 2013).1 In this paper, we expand the empirical literature on the determinants 
of monetary policy cyclicality by examining the role of monetary regimes. Specifically, 
we look at whether the adoption of an inflation targeting (IT) regime has facilitated the 
procyclicality of monetary policy by evaluating the treatment effect of IT on monetary 
policy cyclicality using propensity score-matching methods, which have the advantage 
of avoiding the ‘self-selection problem’ that can give rise to biased results. 
 
There are several reasons for believing that adoption of an IT regime could facilitate 
procyclical monetary policy. The first and probably most important reason is the impact 
of IT on monetary policy credibility: adopting a single mandate such as IT can be an 
effective way for a central bank that cannot commit to overcome the classic time-
inconsistency problem. Policy credibility should be enhanced by the rules-based 
approach of IT and its emphasis on transparency and accountability relative to other 
monetary frameworks. Recent research suggests IT adoption has positive credibility 
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effects, for example, as measured by subsequent developments in government 
borrowing costs (Palomino, 2012; Thornton and Vasilakis 2016). Second, the exchange 
rate flexibility inherent in IT should reduce the sensitivity of interest rates in so far it 
provides a mechanism for the correction of external imbalances not available with an 
exchange rate peg (Jahjah, Wei, and Yue 2013). Third, the adoption of IT may signal a 
commitment to economic reforms and sounder macroeconomic policies (Roger 2010). 
Finally, because of the constraint that an IT framework imposes on seigniorage 
revenues, IT adoption could result in better fiscal discipline and fiscal reforms that 
boost fiscal revenue and contain spending (Minea and Tapsoba 2014).2  
 
Formal empirical evidence on the impact of IT on the cyclicality of monetary policy 
appears to be limited to McGettingham, Moriyama, Ntsama, Painchard, Qu, and 
Steinberg (2013). They apply panel regression techniques to 64 developing and high-
income countries during the period 1985-2011 and report that countries that have 
adopted an IT framework tend to have more countercyclical monetary policy—that is, 
they find an improvement in the correlation coefficient between real interest rates and 
output in these countries. A drawback of this study is that it ignores the self-selection 
problem of policy adoption that arises when a country’s targeting choice is nonrandom 
and can lead to biased estimates. In particular, systematic correlation between the 
targeting choice and other covariates will cause the selection-on-observables problem, 
which can lead to biased estimates. We find evidence for the existence of this problem 
with an IT dummy in probit estimates being systematically correlated with variables 
such as macroeconomic performance, the level of public debt, the level of financial 
development, and the exchange rate regime. To address the self-selection problem, we 
evaluate the treatment effect of IT on monetary policy cyclicality making use of 
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propensity score-matching methods. Our results indicate that IT has reduced 
procyclicality by about 11 per cent of the correlation between the cyclical components 
of output and real interest rates.  
 
2. Methodology 
 
We test the impact of IT adoption on the cyclicality of monetary policy by examining 
developments in a 10-year rolling window correlation between the cyclical component 
of real GDP and the cyclical component of the real short-term interest rate, where the 
latter is our proxy for the stance of monetary policy.3 A positive correlation is indicative 
of countercyclical monetary policy, while a negative correlation indicates procyclical 
monetary policy. The treatment group comprises 22 advanced and developing 
economies that had adopted IT by the end of 2014. We draw on Hammond (2012) for 
a listing of countries that adopted IT and for the adoption dates. The control group 
comprises 68 non-IT countries for which we could access data on interest rates and the 
different control variables. 10-year rolling window correlations between the cyclical 
components of real interest rates and real GDP for the IT and non-IT countries are 
shown in Table 1.4 The table shows the average correlation for the pre- and post-IT 
periods for the inflation targeting countries, and for pre- and post-1999 for the non-IT 
countries, with 1999 chosen simply because this is the mean year of IT adoption by the 
inflation targeting countries. In both IT and non-IT countries, monetary policy became 
more countercyclical on average (i.e., the correlation coefficients increased). Annual 
developments in the average rolling correlation coefficients for IT and non-IT countries 
are shown in Figure 1. Again, there appears to be little to choose between their 
experiences, with convergence in the average correlation coefficients after 2007 and 
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suggestions of more procyclical policies during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and more 
countercyclical policies thereafter. 
 
We make use of four propensity score-matching methods that have been applied 
recently to macroeconomic policy evaluations (e.g., Glick, Guo, and Hutchinson 2006, 
Lin and Ye 2007 2009). The first is the nearest-neighbour matching with replacement, 
which matches each treated country to the N control countries that have the closest 
propensity scores. We employ two nearest-neighbour matching estimators: n = 1 and n 
= 3. The second method is radius matching, which performs the matching based on 
estimated propensity scores falling with a certain radius R. We use a wide radius 
(r=0.05), a medium radius (r=0.03), and a tight radius (r=0.01). The third method is the 
kernel matching method, which matches a treated group country to all control group 
countries weighted in proportion to the closeness between the treated group country 
and the control group country. The fourth method is the regression adjusted local linear 
matching method. 
 
3. Estimating the average treatment effects 
 
We first estimate the propensity scores using a probit model in the probability of 
adopting an IT framework is conditional on a group of control variables: 
 
 𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙(𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽) + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                                                       (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a 0,1 dummy variable for the adoption of an IT regime (where 1 indicates 
IT adoption), 𝑋𝑖𝑡  is a set of control variables, 𝜙  is the cumulative function of the 
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standard normal distribution, and 𝜂𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We then utilize the estimated 
propensity scores to conduct matching to obtain the treatment effects of IT adoption. 
For the independent variables, we draw on Samarina and de Haan’s (2014) analysis of 
the determinants of a country’s decision to adopt an IT framework. Their findings 
suggest that countries are more likely to adopt IT if they have low inflation, high real 
GDP growth, a flexible exchange rate regime, are more integrated into the world 
economy, have a history of fiscal discipline, and have more developed financial 
markets. Accordingly, the dependent variables in our baseline probit model are: the 
lagged inflation rate, real GDP growth, the ratios to GDP of public debt, foreign trade, 
and bank credit to the private sector. In addition, we employ the Chinn and Ito (2006) 
financial openness index, and a measure of exchange rate regime flexibility, for which 
we use the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) course grid classification system. The 
macroeconomic variables are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database, and we draw on Abbas, Belhocine, El Ganainy, and Horton (2010) and the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook database for data on public debt. The results from the 
probit model are reported in Table 2. The baseline result in column 1 of the table 
broadly supports the Samarina and de Haan (2014) analysis—that is, IT adoption is 
more likely in countries that have relatively high rates of GDP growth, relatively low 
levels of inflation and public debt, are more integrated into the global economy through 
open trade and capital accounts, and have more flexible exchange rate regimes and 
relatively deep financial markets. 
 
To ensure greater comparability between the treatment group and the control group, we 
discard the control group countries whose estimated propensity scores are lower than 
the lowest score among the treatment group countries. The matching results are 
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presented in Table 3, which reports the estimated average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATTs) of monetary policy cyclicality. The baseline results are in the first row of the 
table and show that the ATTs are positive, highly statistically significant, and quite 
large in magnitude at about 11% of the correlation coefficient. That is, the correlation 
between the cyclical components of monetary policy (real interest rates) and real GDP 
rises following the adoption of an IT framework, which we interpret as reflecting a fall 
in the procyclicality of monetary policy.  
 
We carry out three tests to check the robustness of our finding that IT significantly 
reduces monetary policy procyclicality in IT-adopting countries. First, we take into 
account that many countries in the sample (inflation-targeters and non-targeters) 
experienced financial crises during the period, which likely impacted on the conduct of 
monetary policy and could bias our results. The probit estimate including a financial 
crisis dummy is reported in the second column of Table 2. The coefficient on the crisis 
dummy is not statistically significant, and the associated ATTs reported in the second 
row of Table 3 remain of the same sign, statistically significant, and of a similar 
magnitude as the baseline result. Second, to avoid the suspicion that very high rates of 
inflation in some countries might be driving the results, we dropped high-inflation 
(above 100 percent) countries from the sample. These probit results are reported in 
column 3 of Table 2 and are comparable to those for the full sample of countries. The 
associated ATTs are reported in row 3 of Table 3 and also are largely unchanged in 
terms of sign, size and statistical significance. Finally, we examine the sensitivity of 
our results to the country composition of the sample by splitting the sample into 
industrial and developing economies on the grounds that the latter tend to have had a 
more volatile experience with respect to output and inflation and they might be expected 
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to face greater difficulty in managing the technical challenges of implementing an IT 
framework. The probit results for industrial and developing countries are reported in 
columns 4 and 5 of Table 2, respectively. The main differences between the two sets of 
countries are that GDP growth and open capital accounts levels are not statistically 
significant factors in the decision by industrial countries of whether or not to adopt an 
IT framework, and that developing economies are less likely to adopt IT if they have 
experienced a financial crisis. The associated ATTs are reported in rows 4 and 5 of 
Table 3 and remain in line with the baseline estimate for the full sample of countries. 
That is, the adoption of an IT framework appears to reduce the procyclicality of 
monetary policy in both industrial and developing countries.5 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we evaluated the treatment effect of IT on the cyclicality of monetary 
policy in industrial and developing economies. We used propensity score matching 
methods to show that the average treatment effect of IT on increasing the counter-
cyclicality of monetary policy is statistically significant and quantitatively quite large 
in IT countries. On average, the adoption of IT has led to a rise in the correlation 
coefficient between the cyclical components of monetary policy and real GDP of about 
11 per cent. This result is robust to controlling for the effects financial crises and 
removing high-inflation countries from the sample, and appears to be valid for both 
industrial and developing country IT adopters.  
Footnotes 
1. Recent work suggests that greater counter cyclicality might be transmitted by the 
effects of monetary and macroeconomic policy announcements on liquidity flows (e.g., 
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Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam 2005; Sensoy 2016) or a pass-through from 
treasury bills to private yields (Kiley 2016). 
2. Of course, not all the evidence is that IT adoption is beneficial. For example, Ball 
and Sheridan (2005) find no evidence that economic performance (measured by the 
behavior of inflation, output, and interest rates) improved in adopting countries relative 
non-adopting countries in a sample of OECD countries; and Thornton (2016) reports 
that adoption of an IT did not help reduce inflation and growth volatility in developing 
countries compared to the average experience with other monetary regimes and was no 
more advantageous in these regards than the adoption of a hard or crawling peg 
exchange rate regime. 
3. See McGettingham, Moriyama, Ntsama, Painchard, Qu and Steinberg, 2013; and 
Vegh and Vuletin 2013 for similar approaches to measuring the cyclicality of monetary 
policy. 
4. The real interest rate is measured as the average interest rate less the average rate of 
consumer price inflation; interest rates are mainly central bank discount rates (from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics database) because of their longer availability, 
though in some cases we have data for overnight interbank interest rates. The cyclical 
components of interest rates and GDP are derived from the average of the estimated 
trend in each series using a HP filter with lambda 100 and 6.25. 
5. At the suggestion of a referee, we also employed an alternative probit model for the 
probability of adopting an IT framework as the basis estimating the propensity scores, 
using the ‘monetary independence index’ (MI index) calculated by Aizenman, Chinn 
and Ito (2008) in place of the exchange rate regime and financial openness indicators 
In the probit estimate, the coefficient on the MI index in the probit estimate is positive 
and statistically significant, indicating that IT adoption is more likely in countries with 
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more monetary independence; and the corresponding matching results do not differ 
substantially from those reported in Table 3. (Results available on request.) 
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